 Foreign automakers are stumbling as the Trump administration's trade war delivers a bruising blow and Chinese automakers bear down, writes Nathan Bomey Axios.
Why it matters: Much of the U.S. conversation over the impact of auto tariffs has centered on Detroit's Big Three but the blast zone extends far beyond General Motors, Ford and Stellantis. By the numbers: Nissan, which was already facing operational issues, said today its quarterly loss doubled from a year ago. Mercedes-Benz posted a 9.2% drop in 2025 revenue, while net profit fell nearly in half. Honda disclosed a 42% plunge in profit and a 2% decline in revenue. Toyota last week replaced its CEO after projecting a 25% decline in net income for the year ended March 31. Volvo Cars reported an 11% revenue decline in 2025 and swung to a loss from a profit a year earlier. The big picture: Trump's protectionist trade framework has bludgeoned foreign automakers, even those with U.S. production footprints. Toyota and Honda have significant American manufacturing operations but continue to rely heavily on an international supply chain, including imports from Japan, (Subject to tariffs). Meanwhile, Chinese automakers including BYD and others, are surging in markets outside the U.S., presenting a serious threat to the Asian and European automakers. BYD last year sold more vehicles than Ford for the first time and sold more pure electric vehicles than Tesla, another first. The bottom line: No automaker is immune to global trade and technology turmoil. [In the UK manufacturing output fell by 0.2% in 2025, compared to last year. Overall growth GDP basis, eased to 1% in the final quarter from almost 2% in the first quarter of the year. Growth of 1.3% year on year will do little to ease the constraints on public sector finance as we move into a new financial year.] JKA
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 Economics and Financial Markets Analyst - What can we make of the FED decision on rates this month ...
Executive Summary: The "Strategic Pause" Amidst Political Crosswinds The FOMC’s January 2026 decision to maintain the federal funds rate at 3.50% – 3.75% marks a definitive shift from the "insurance cuts" of late 2025 to a high-vigilance "wait-and-see" posture. While the statement acknowledges a "solid" economic expansion and a stabilizing labor market, the internal rift is widening. A 10-2 vote—featuring rare dissents from Governors Waller and Miran—reveals a Committee split between those prioritizing the inflation fight and those fearing a delayed reaction to labor market cooling. 1. The Policy Pivot: From Easing to Evaluation ... After 75 basis points of cuts in Q4 2025, the Fed has hit the brakes. The January statement upgraded the economic assessment from "modest" to "solid," signaling that the US consumer and business investment remain resilient despite previous tightening. Rate Range: 3.50% to 3.75% (Unchanged). The "Neutral" Target: Chair Powell signaled that the Fed believes it is now within the "range of plausible estimates of neutral." This suggests that further cuts are no longer a foregone conclusion but will require clear evidence of disinflation or labor distress. Inflation Sticky-ness: The statement kept the phrase "somewhat elevated," a nod to PCE prices hovering near 2.9% - 3.0%, exacerbated by recent tariff pass-through in the goods sector. 2. The Great Divide: A Non-Consensus Vote ... The most striking element of the meeting was the dual dissent, signalling a breakdown in the Fed’s usual "united front" strategy: Governor Christopher Waller: His dissent in favor of a 25bp cut is seen by analysts as a strategic positioning. As a leading candidate to succeed Powell in May 2026, Waller is signaling a more pro-growth, "dovish" lean that aligns closer to the administration's preference. Governor Stephen Miran: A Trump appointee, Miran has consistently pushed for more aggressive easing, arguing that the neutral rate is lower than the Committee currently believes. Strategic Divergence: This 10-2 split highlights a growing concern that keeping rates at 3.5%+ while job gains remain "low" risks an accidental hard landing, even as headline growth looks “solid." 3. Market Impressions & Macro Risks ... The market reaction was a "hawkish hold." Treasury yields edged higher as the "Dot Plot" and Powell’s rhetoric suggested fewer cuts in 2026 than the 2-3 previously priced in by the OIS curve. Labor Market "Stabilisation": The Fed noted the unemployment rate (sitting at 4.4%) is no longer "edging up" but "stabilising." This removes the immediate pressure to cut for employment support. The "Shadow" Mandate: The elephant in the room remains the political environment. With Chair Powell facing a DOJ investigation and President Trump openly criticising "incompetent" policy, the Fed is desperately trying to assert its independence. Powell’s attendance at the Supreme Court for Governor Lisa Cook’s case underscores the legal and constitutional siege currently surrounding the institution. Digital & Disruptive Tailwinds: Powell alluded to productivity boosts (likely AI-driven) and fiscal stimulus as factors keeping growth robust, which ironically provides the Fed "higher-for-longer" cover. 4. Outlook: The "May Cliff" The Fed is now in a holding pattern until at least June. With Powell’s term ending in May, the "lame duck" period has officially begun. Markets should expect heightened volatility as the battle for the next Fed Chair intensifies, potentially shifting the FOMC from a data-dependent body to one increasingly sensitive to the incoming administration's fiscal expansion plans.  Gold Blasts Through $5,000 Handle With Care Gold has indeed blasted through the 5,100 dollars per ounce level for the first time, with the move driven by a mix of safe‑haven demand, dollar weakness, and geopolitical/fiscal stress.
Where prices are now Spot gold has traded in the 5,000–5,100 dollars range, with intraday highs around 5,110 dollars per ounce. On the day in question, indicative trading ranges of roughly 5,011–5,055 dollars are consistent with a 2–2.5 percent daily move. Over the past month, gold is up about 17.7 percent, and roughly 86 percent year‑on‑year, confirming the magnitudes you cite. Drivers of the move Geopolitical tension: Escalating conflicts and policy unpredictability (including aggressive tariff threats and broader “Trump‑era” policy volatility) have boosted demand for traditional safe havens. Dollar weakness: The dollar index has fallen to multi‑month lows, partly on expectations around the Federal Reserve and a stronger yen, making dollar‑priced gold cheaper for non‑US buyers. Central‑bank buying: Official sector demand, notably persistent Chinese reserve accumulation, has underpinned the market. ETF and retail flows: Strong inflows into gold‑backed funds and aggressive retail participation have amplified the move. Monetary backdrop: Looser US policy expectations and concerns about real returns on financial assets support a higher equilibrium gold price. Context and implications The current level around 5,100 dollars is an all‑time high for gold in nominal terms. Silver and other precious metals have also broken records (silver above 100 dollars per ounce), indicating a broad precious‑metals safe‑haven and momentum trade rather than an isolated gold move. Several banks and analysts now project upside scenarios towards 6,000 dollars per ounce in 2026, while warning of the likelihood of sharp interim corrections given how far and fast prices have run. One way to frame it (economics lens) You can read this as a classic crisis‑confidence barometer: an 86 percent year‑on‑year rise in gold, coinciding with a weaker reserve currency, aggressive tariffs, and geopolitical risk, signals a market increasingly willing to pay a substantial insurance premium against tail events in currencies and financial assets. Handle With Care The Saturday Economist AI and Perplexity AI  A New York Times/Siena poll released Thursday found 69 percent of registered voters 18-29 disapproved of Trump’s handling of the presidency, while just 26 percent approved. A notable 54 percent said they “strongly” disapprove of his handling.
A CNN poll released this month found 69 percent of U.S. adults 18-34 disapproved of the way Trump is handling his job as president, compared to just 30 percent who approved. And a YouGov poll conducted this month found 62 percent of registered voters under 30 disapprove of Trump’s handling of the presidency, compared to 36 percent who approve. That’s a net negative of roughly 26 percent. But what’s remarkable about this poll is that Trump had a net positive of 7.6 percent in January 2025, a stunning 34 percentage-point drop in a year. In talking with young voters and polling experts, a few possible reasons for the move away from Trump emerged. One, we were told, young voters expect to see results quickly. Two, they do not have the sort of party loyalty their elders do. Three, in some cases, they see his policies as being more extreme than they expected. Together, these factors may be creating a situation where young voters are jumping ship. Rachel Janfaza, an independent journalist who tracks young people’s political habits, said young voters in 2024 felt that life was unaffordable and took a chance at backing Trump despite possibly disagreeing with him on other issues. “But now they’re like, this isn’t what I signed up for,” Janfaza said. “Our generation is driven by issues, not partisan loyalty, and also really moves at the speed of digital culture and online culture,” added Janfaza, who is 28. “That’s part of why the sort of vibes shift so quickly is because that’s the speed at which the internet moves.” Jo Rogan Said “You don’t want militarised people in the streets just roaming around, snatching up people — many of which turn out to be U.S. citizens that just don’t have their papers on them,” Rogan said this month on his podcast. “Are we really going to be the Gestapo, ‘Where’s your papers?’ Is that what we’ve come to?” “Young men didn’t back Trump in ’24 because they loved chaos; they backed him for strength, stability and some control over their lives,” said Della Volpe, who is the director of polling at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Institute of Politics. “In our spring focus groups, many seemed willing to give him some time, but that goodwill is dissipating fast — especially when daily life feels so expensive, and Trump’s attention has turned elsewhere.” Washington Post 23 January 2026  It has been 12 months since President Donald Trump’s second inauguration on January 20, 2025, and to say it’s been an eventful year would be a massive understatement. We’ve seen the DOGE-led gutting of federal government agencies, a whirlwind of tariff announcements, a rigorous and seemingly indiscriminate immigration crackdown and the longest-ever government shutdown in history.
We’ve seen the U.S. pull out of dozens of international organizations and treaties, question long-standing alliances and fully embrace a new “America First” approach to foreign policy. In the past three weeks alone, the U.S. captured Venezuela’s President Nicolás Maduro, took control of the country and is now trying to strongarm Denmark and other European allies into giving up Greenland. And while Trump and his supporters would read this as a progress report, as a list of all the things the president got done, his political opponents shudder at the thought of how much more damage will be done over the next three years if America is already barely recognizable after one year of Trump 2.0. The American public, while not as vocal in their criticism of the administration as many observers would hope, is not particularly happy with Trump’s first year back in office. According to RealClearPolitics, Trump’s average approval across 13 national polls currently stands at 42.5 percent, which is close to the lowest it’s been since his return to the White House. Meanwhile an average of 55.1 percent disapprove of the president’s job performance, with Trump’s net approval, i.e. the difference between the share of people approving and disapproving of the job he’s doing, negative across all polls. Looking ahead at the midterms in the fall, Trump’s low popularity doesn’t bode well for the Republican Party. With some experts expecting a Republican “wipeout” that could result in the Democrats taking control of the Senate, Trump has, some say jokingly, suggested that there shouldn’t even be an election given how well he’s doing. It wasn’t the first time that the president mused about not wanting elections. When Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky mentioned that his country doesn’t allow to hold elections during periods of martial law, Trump joked that if the U.S. was in a war in 2028, that would good for him. Given the events of January 6, 2021, it is perhaps understandable that many people don’t think this matter should be joked about. Felix Richter Statista https://www.statista.com/chart/34379/us-respondents-who-approve-disapprove-of-us-president-donald-trumps-job-performance/  U.S. Leadership Approval Slips Among NATO Allies
Anna Fleck, Statista Jan 21, 2026 World leaders have descended on Davos, Switzerland this week to discuss global economic and geopolitical challenges, from Ukraine to artificial intelligence. Top of the agenda, however, is Greenland, following the much-anticipated arrival of U.S. President Donald Trump today amid heightened tensions between Washington and Europe. In an address to European and NATO leaders, Trump said the United States is “seeking immediate negotiations” to acquire Greenland, adding that he “won’t use force”. Against this backdrop, new Gallup data illustrates how perceptions of U.S. leadership have shifted over the past year. Approval of Washington across 31 NATO allies fell 14 percentage points between 2024 and 2025, to just 21 percent, marking the lowest level since 2020, when it fell to 18 percent during U.S. President Donald Trump’s first term in office. The steepest declines were recorded in Germany (-39 percentage points) and Portugal (-38 percentage points), with approval falling by at least 10 percentage points in 18 cases overall. Turkey saw the highest increase in approval, posting a 12-point increase. The data was collected between March and October 2025, prior to recent developments such as the military action in Venezuela and the latest escalation over Greenland. Perceptions of China meanwhile have warmed somewhat. Approval of Beijing among NATO allies rose 8 percentage points to 22 percent in 2025, roughly matching U.S. levels. Gains were particularly pronounced in Turkey (+21 p.p.), Spain (+15 p.p.) and Greece (+14 p.p.). While the polling is from last year, more positive sentiment appears to have carried into 2026, at least in the case of Canada, as expressed by Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, who announced plans last week to work more closely with Beijing on trade in an effort to reduce dependence on the United States. Approval of Russia remained low at 10 percent, while the EU was viewed most favorably, with a 60 percent approval rating. https://www.statista.com/chart/35721/change-in-approval-of-us-and-chinese-leadership-among-nato-countries/  The £160 Billion Reality Check: Why the UK’s Fiscal Math No Longer Adds Up
Executive Summary: The UK’s public finances are currently navigating a dangerous "complacency gap." While the ONS headline for November borrowing (£11.7bn) suggested a modest year-on-year improvement, the cumulative reality is stark: the UK has borrowed £132.3bn in just eight months. With the OBR’s full-year target now mathematically detached from the historical run-rate, we are staring at a £20bn–£25bn overshoot. The "fiscal headroom" used to anchor the Autumn Budget is not just under pressure, it is essentially a phantom. For investors and corporate strategists, the message is clear: the risk of a Q1 fiscal reckoning is now the base case. 1. The November "Headfake". The City focused on the November print of £11.7 billion, a figure that was £1.9bn lower than the previous year. On paper, it looks like progress. In reality, it is a statistical distraction. The drop was largely driven by a surge in central government tax receipts (up 6.7%) and a temporary dip in debt interest payable. But these are cyclical cushions, not structural fixes. Despite these tailwinds, the borrowing figure still topped market expectations of £10.2bn. The "good news" is skin-deep; the structural deficit remains stubbornly high. 2. OBR vs. Reality: The Mathematical Inevitability The true story lies in the cumulative data. From April to November 2025, the UK borrowed £132.3 billion. This is the second-highest April–November period on record, eclipsed only by the peak of the 2020 pandemic. The current run rate is 8% ahead of last year’s £152.6 billion. (The financial yeear out turn). The OBR forecast for the entire financial year is £138.3 billion. Let’s look at the "Mission Impossible" maths: Total borrowed to date: £132.3bn Total OBR forecast for FY25/26: £138.3bn Remaining "allowance" for Dec–Mar: £6 billion For the Treasury to hit its target, it would need to average a mere £1.5bn of borrowing per month through March. For context, the average borrowing for that same four-month window over the past three years was £28.5 billion. We are on track for a total out turn of £161bn–£165bn. 3. The Death of "Fiscal Headroom" In the Autumn Budget, the Chancellor claimed a fiscal buffer of approximately £22bn–£24bn against the stability rules. This "headroom" was the primary shield against market volatility. However, if borrowing overshoots by £20bn+ (as the current run-rate dictates), that headroom is effectively wiped out before the ink is dry on the Spring Statement. This creates a strategic pincer movement for the government either: Redefine the metrics (again): Moving the goalposts to "Public Sector Net Worth" or other wider balance sheet measures. Emergency Consolidation: Scouring the departments for "efficiency savings" or introducing further back-loaded tax measures to placate the bond vigilantes. 4. Market Implications: The Gilt Market "Coiled Spring" The Gilt market has been surprisingly quiet, but this calm is fragile. As the scale of the overshoot becomes undeniable in Q1 2026, the Debt Management Office (DMO) will likely be forced to increase its issuance calendar. With the Bank of England continuing its Quantitative Tightening (QT) program, the private sector is being asked to absorb a historic volume of paper. If the market perceives that the Treasury has lost its grip on the borrowing trajectory, expect the Term Premium to spike. A "fiscal risk" premium on UK debt would ripple through the economy, raising the cost of capital for corporations and keeping mortgage rates "higher for longer.” 5. The January Reckoning The final "wildcard" is January. As the month of major Self-Assessment tax receipts, January usually provides a substantial surplus that offsets the winter spending surge. However, given the cooling high-end labor market and subdued productivity growth, the risk of a revenue miss is significant. If January receipts don't deliver a record-breaking surplus, the £160bn borrowing floor becomes an absolute certainty. The Bottom Line The UK is running a "peacetime" deficit at "wartime" levels. While the Treasury may attempt to manage the optics, the ONS data is uncompromising. We are entering a period of high fiscal sensitivity where every data release carries the potential for a market re-pricing. The Spring Statement will not be a victory lap for growth; it will be a high-wire act of deficit management. Editor’s Note: This analysis was developed by our research team in collaboration with Gemini AI and rigorously reviewed by our editorial board to ensure accuracy, integrity, and our signature style.  US Inflation: November CPI—Disinflation or Data Mirage?
The markets have spent the last 48 hours in a state of caffeine-fueled euphoria. On paper, the November Consumer Price Index (CPI) print of 2.7%, a cooling from September’s 3.0%, looks like a decisive victory for the Federal Reserve. It is the kind of number that makes a soft landing feel less like a pilot’s prayer and more like an impending reality. But at The Saturday Economist, we prefer to look under the hood. And right now, the engine of the US economy is emitting a very strange rattle. The November report is not a clean read; it is a "Franken-report," stitched together from missing pieces and statistical guesswork. Due to the 43-day federal government shutdown, October data was never collected. For the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), this meant the "gold standard" of economic data had to be replaced by "bridging"—a polite term for imputation and technical extrapolation. The "Shutdown Distortion" Factor : The headline 2.7% figure is arguably the least reliable data point of 2025. Because BLS field workers were sidelined during the shutdown, they relied heavily on proxies. The most glaring issue lies in Shelter. Comprising roughly one-third of the total CPI, shelter costs were effectively "zeroed out" for the October portion of the calculation. This creates a mathematical downward bias. While the report suggests rents and housing costs are cooling, the reality on the ground, marked by rising property taxes and insurance premiums, tells a different story. Furthermore, field work only resumed on November 14. This means the "November" report is effectively a snapshot of the month’s second half, missing the early-month consumer behavior that often sets the tone for the holiday quarter. We aren't looking at a full month of data; we are looking at a polaroid taken in a dark room with a failing flash. The Kitchen Table Disconnect: While the "official" numbers cooled, the lived experience of the US consumer remains stubbornly hot. There is a widening divergence between technical disinflation and "kitchen table" inflation. Consider the Energy and Utilities sector. Despite the headline drop, the energy index surged 4.2% year-over-year. Dig deeper, and it gets worse: electricity and natural gas are up 6.9% and 9.1% respectively. If you are a manufacturer or a homeowner, "disinflation" is a word used by people who don't pay your bills. Even the cooling in Core CPI (ex-food and energy), which slowed to 2.6%, requires an asterisk. This was largely driven by a deceleration in discretionary categories like used vehicles and apparel. Retailers, fearing a shutdown-induced slump, slashed prices to move inventory. This is "desperation disinflation," not a systemic cooling of the services sector, which remains propped up by elevated wage growth. The Fed is Flying with a Cracked Windshield: For Jerome Powell, this report is a strategic nightmare. The Fed’s preferred gauge, the Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) index, is also facing disruptions. The Fed is essentially flying a jumbo jet with a cracked windshield and a flickering GPS. We expect the FOMC to treat this report as a technical outlier. While "doves" are already using the 2.7% figure to demand aggressive rate cuts in 2026, the Fed cannot credibly claim "mission accomplished" when nearly half the data in this report is imputed. However, there is a pivot coming but not for the reason the markets think. With the labor market showing genuine signs of fatigue (unemployment hitting a 4-year high of 4.6%), the Fed is more likely to cut rates in January due to growth fears rather than inflation success. They aren't cutting because they won; they are cutting because the floor is starting to creak. The Analyst's Verdict: The November data is a technical gift for equity markets but a strategic headache for economists. We are seeing a "catch-down" effect where the lack of October data artificially accelerated the path to the 2% target. We advise strategic caution. The primary risk is a "snap-back" in the December or January data. Once full-month data collection stabilizes, we expect a "hotter" corrective read that could catch a jubilant market off-guard, forcing the Fed to pause its easing cycle just as investors are betting on a free-fall in rates. In short: the trend is your friend, but the data is a stranger. Don't trust it with your house keys just yet. Editor’s Note: This analysis was developed by our research team in collaboration with Gemini AI and rigorously reviewed by our editorial board to ensure accuracy, integrity, and our signature style.  Private Credit Collapses Spark Fears of ‘Subprime’ Risks in New Lending Frontier.
The Bank of England has compared the collapse of US private credit firms to the 2007 subprime crisis. Governor Andrew Bailey says it’s an ‘open question’ if collapse of First Brands and Tricolor is merely idiosyncratic or “the canary in the coalmine”. Boss of JP Morgan, Jamie Dimon, warned over further losses linked to the private credit sector, saying more “cockroaches could emerge” and they could be crawling to Europe. The collapse of two US firms has highlighted the risks in the private credit market, and compared it to the subprime mortgage failures that preceeded the 2008 financial crisis. Sarah Breeden Deputy Governor has suggested the First Brands and Tricolor collapse illustrate some of the risks the Bank has been talking about in this market for some time. “It’s about high leverage, it’s about opacity, it’s about complexity and it’s about weak underwriting standards. These factors appear to have been at play in the context of the two defaults. Last week, the boss of JP Morgan, Jamie Dimon, warned over further losses linked to the private credit sector, saying more “cockroaches” could emerge and they could be crawling to Europe. Both firms had been backed by private credit within the so-called shadow banking sector, which is not directly regulated and is not forced to disclose the level of risks on their books. Regulated banks such as JP Morgan are exposed to the private credit sector, either by lending directly to private businesses, or lending to the private credit firms themselves. What do we mean by the private credit market? The private credit market refers to lending conducted by non-bank lenders, such as private credit firms, asset managers, or private equity funds, who provide loans directly to businesses, typically outside of traditional public or syndicated markets. These private loans are customized, often targeting small-to-mid-sized enterprises or companies with less-than-investment-grade credit profiles. They are held to maturity in “buy and hold” style portfolios rather than traded on a public exchange. Private Credit has become the financial markets' new frontier. Beyond banks, direct lenders and global funds are writing loans for companies who don't fit the public bond mould. The market's exponential growth, now a $3 trillion force, brings greater flexibility but also echoes the hidden risks of the subprime mortgage crisis. The recent collapses of First Brands and Tricolor remind us that opacity and rapid expansion can breed systemic tremors. As policymakers urge caution, it's time for market participants to focus on risk, resilience, and transparency. References https://www.theguardian.com/business/2025/oct/14/jp-morgan-jamie-dimon-losses-private-credit-sector https://www.theguardian.com/business/live/2025/oct/21/uk-borrowing-outstrips-forecasts-reeves-amazon-web-services-outage-resolved-bank-of-england-stock-markets-business-live-news  Donald Trump’s Dream Palace of Puffery
The Pentagon’s ban on real journalism looks to be a preview of where the White House is headed. Susan B Glasser The New Yorker October 16th 2025 Trump, it appears, is building a dream palace of endless puffery for himself, a gilded safe space where there will be no more tough questions, no more pesky reporters or impertinent demands for information that he does not want to give. And imagine how very powerful the President, who already believes the Constitution gives him the power “to do whatever I want,” will feel then. The Pentagon’s move to effectively ban journalism from its halls this week was not an outlier—it was a preview. You might think that the Kremlinization of the White House press pool doesn’t really matter at a moment when there are so many other Trump-generated crises in the country. Or that it is simply self-serving of journalists to complain about their own perks being taken away. Or that the President has no obligation, legal or otherwise, to answer questions from anyone. All of which are fair points. But the reason to pay attention to what’s happening with the coverage of the Presidency is that Trump cares about it perhaps more than anything else. There has never been a more media-obsessed President, nor one for whom the regard of others, even if it is suck-uppery in the crudest form, matters so much. He is known to spend hours a day consuming cable-news reports about himself. There is no detail of his public portrayal that does not concern him. In a lengthy social-media post this week, he berated Time for a cover about his Middle East diplomacy which was so complimentary it was headlined “His Triumph.” Trump’s beef was with the accompanying photo of himself, which he deemed “the Worst of All Time.” The point being: there is no pleasing a leader whose need for affirmation is so bottomless. The template for Trump’s second term so far has been to remake the White House as a place increasingly devoid of constraints or criticism. Gone are the first-term advisers such as John Kelly or Jim Mattis who saw themselves as checks on Trump’s tendency to go rogue. Only yes-men and flatterers need apply, and more and more they seem to be competing with one another to come up with the most over-the-top compliments possible for the boss. Last weekend, during a rally in Tel Aviv to celebrate the Trump-brokered deal to release the Israeli hostages, Trump’s Middle East negotiator, Steve Witkoff, proclaimed him “the greatest President in American history.” It doesn’t take much imagination to think what talk like that from his advisers does to a man with Trump’s ego. Those questions from reporters may soon be the last thing left tethering the President to at least some form of reality. ["Democracy Dies In Darkness", The absence of a press pool helps'] Check out the full article here : |
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